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1 Introduction 
This paper represents the first attempt to investigate the consequences of the Russian 
involvement in the 2014 Ukrainian crisis. We examine the dramatic developments in Ukraine vis-à-
vis their effects on the behavior of the Russian stock market by studying the changes in the dynamic 
interactions between Russian stock index returns and those from a representative sample of 
emerging, frontier and developed markets. Our main aim is to unveil the question of financial 
contagion from the Russian market, particularly on markets from countries with relatively strong 
economic ties to Russia. The subject of the paper is at the heart of financial literature and recently 
received renewed attention in the context of the 2008 global financial crisis (e.g. Bekaert et al., 2009; 
Bekaert et al., 2014, Miguel and Polk, 2014) and the European sovereign debt crisis (Missio and 
Watzka, 2011; Mink and De Haan, 2013). 
We employ the dynamic (DCC) and the varying conditional correlation (VCC) AR-MGARCH 
models and apply Fisher’s z-transformation to test for changes in the dynamics of volatility-
unconditional correlations between the returns on the Russia stock market and 18 emerging, frontier 
and developed equity markets. Our results reveal that the degree of co-movement between Russian 
index returns and the returns in the vast majority of international markets significantly declined in the 
aftermath of the Ukrainian crisis. Contrary to our expectations, the results for countries with closer 
economic ties to Russia are in line with the general trend during this period, indicating effectively no 
transmission channel via increased co-movement of stock returns. In fact, the last time Russian 
stock returns were so weakly associated with global market returns was in the period 2002-04, when 
the Russian market was hardly on the radars of international portfolio investors. Nevertheless, we 
also show that for a number of frontier and emerging economies that large volatility spillovers 
associated with the Russian market occurred and that the crisis period coincided with the 
appearance of asymmetric effects in a substantial proportion of considered markets.  
In consideration of the factors potentially affecting current developments in the Russian 
market, our results suggest that an increased advantage of including Russian stocks in 
internationally diversified equity investment portfolios is unlikely. In the background of still being 
regarded as a major emerging market, the Russian stock market’s declining capitalization and 
decreasing free-float led to a dramatic drop in Russia’s weight in investable equity indices, such as 
the MSCI Emerging Markets Index. For example, the weight of the Russian stocks in iShares MSCI 
Emerging Markets ETF, which tracks the MSCI Emerging Markets Index, dropped to 3.76%, lagging 
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behind markets such as Mexico, South Africa, and Brazil1. In view of the limited choice of investments 
due to the sanctions imposed on Russia, the decreased co-movement of the Russian market with 
the rest of the world is unlikely to provide investors with superior diversification opportunities. On the 
other hand, if the sanctions are limited, a large flow of equity portfolio investments is likely to be 
observed, given that the market is currently very cheap according to investors.2 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the background to 
the Ukrainian crisis and discusses the potential channels of contagion, section 3 reviews the relevant 
literature, section 4 analyses the data, while section 5 outlines the methodologies used in this work. 
Finally, section 6 reports our findings, section 7 discusses them and presents policy appraisals, 
whereas section 8 provides the main conclusions. 
 
2 The Ukrainian crisis and the channels of contagion from the Russian market 
A wave of demonstrations and civil unrest in Ukraine, which began on the night of 21 
November 2013 culminated with the Parliament removing President Yanukovych from office and 
replacing his government with a pro-European one on 22 February 2014, resulting in the Crimean 
crisis beginning amid pro-Russian unrest. By the end of February, pro-Russian gunmen seized key 
buildings in Crimean capital Simferopol and unidentified gunmen in combat uniforms appeared 
outside Crimea's main airports. Following Russia's parliament approval of President Vladimir Putin's 
request to use forces in Ukraine to protect Russian interests on 1 March, Crimea's secession 
referendum on joining Russia, widely viewed as illegitimate, was conducted on 16 March and backed 
by 97% of voters. Shortly after, on 18 March, President Putin signed a bill to absorb Crimea into the 
Russian Federation. Since then, the economic development of the Russian Federation was heavily 
affected by the consequences of the political and security crisis in Ukraine. Already in March 2014, 
the Ukrainian crisis prompted a number of governments to apply sanctions against individuals, 
businesses and officials from Russia, followed by several rounds of ever tighter sanctions approved 
by the European Union, the United States, as well as other countries and international organizations. 
In addition to diplomatic actions, the measures included travel bans and asset freezes against 
Russian officials, including a broad set of measures targeting sectorial cooperation and exchanges 
with Russia, including additional measures concerning general economic cooperation. In particular, 
Russian state banks were excluded from raising long-term loans, there were bans on arms deals, 
exports of dual-use equipment for military use, and an EU-US ban on exports of some oil industry 
technology and services, just to name a few. Unsurprisingly, the under-diversified and highly 
concentrated nature of the Russian economy characterized by pervasive state control, led to a 
devastating effect of sanctions beyond the targeted sectors. Moreover, Russia responded with a list 
of reciprocal sanctions and embargos for a one-year period on imports of most of the agricultural 
                                                          
1 More information available at: https://www.ishares.com/us/products/239637/ishares-msci-emerging-markets-etf. 
2 More information available at: http://www.cnbc.com/2015/02/24/this-years-best-performing-stock-market-isrussia.html. 
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products whose country of origin had either "adopted the decision on introduction of economic 
sanctions in respect of Russian legal and (or) physical entities, or joined same".3 A dramatic 
turbulence in Russian financial markets and a major slowdown of the Russian economy in the 
aftermath of the sanctions, which revealed already weak fundamentals, were expected to have a 
large impact on a number of economies with strong economic ties to Russia. Eastern European 
countries (including the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS]), which have the closest links 
with Russia, were the most prone to be seriously affected by a sharp slowdown of the Russian 
economy or the implementation of sanctions and countersanctions (IMF, 2014). Although Western 
European countries tend to be relatively less linked to Russia, some of them were also expected to 
foresee noteworthy effects.  
The broad channels by which these countries are connected to Russia include their trade, 
energy, investment, and financial ties. The exposure of exports to the Russian market is a significant 
issue for many of Russia’s immediate neighbors such as Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, and the Baltic 
countries. These countries’ exports to Russia tend to exceed 5 percent of their respective GDP, 
making such economies potentially vulnerable to slowdowns in Russia.    
Western European countries’ trade exposure is typically related to the import of gas and oil from 
Russia, but some industries (e.g. chemicals and minerals, metals, and manufacturing equipment) 
also rely heavily on imported production inputs from Russia. Moreover, Russia supplies about one 
third of Europe’s natural gas. The share of total gas consumption from Russia is over 50 percent in 
virtually all Eastern European countries as well as several advanced economies in Europe. The 
share of Russian supplies in total energy consumption in Europe is moderately smaller, but still very 
important. Russian oil imports also tend to be substantial for many European countries, although 
potential supply disruptions are simpler to overcome than those for gas imports. Overall, “the energy 
channel” of Russian influence, via a price increase or disruption in gas supplies, depends on trade 
partners’ ability to access alternative suppliers or energy sources and is likely to vary significantly 
across countries. In terms of investment flows, by the end of the 2000s Russia became the second 
largest foreign direct investor among emerging markets and, for some countries, foreign direct 
investments (FDI) from Russia tends to exceed 5 percent of GDP (e.g. Ukraine, Bulgaria).4 These 
FDI amounts are often as much politically as commercially driven, but are likely to dry out as a result 
of lower profits of Russian businesses and banks, lacking access to cheap foreign credit as a 
consequence of Western sanctions. The Russian government is also likely to take a less generous 
approach to the various loans, grants and debt-write offs, often used to support its plans to enhance 
its position as regional hegemon (EIU, 2014). Some developed economies, among which stands the 
Netherlands, have significant inward FDI into Russia, while many other financial centers are 
                                                          
3 Presidential Decree of August 6, 2014 N 560 "On the application of certain special economic measures to ensure the security of the 
Russian Federation". www.Garant.ru (in Russian language). 
4 It should be noted that these amounts are likely to underestimate the actual level of investment flows from Russia, as some transfers 
are not recorded as FDI.  
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characterized by two-way FDI flows with Russia. In terms of financial links, a large number of 
Western banks have considerable exposures to Russia. For example, many Hungarian and French 
banks are exposed to Russia both because of the prevalence of their subsidiaries in Russia as well 
as their direct lending to Russian customers from outside the Federation.  For some of these banks, 
the share of profits from Russian operations has increased in excess of 30 percent within the last 
few years (IMF, 2014). Importantly, the slowdown in Russia is likely to generate negative 
externalities, as the same Western banks tend to lend to other countries in Central, Eastern and 
South-Eastern Europe (CESEE). Finally, foreign portfolio investments to Russia are also notable, 
given that Russian assets account for 5–12 percent of emerging market benchmark indices. 
Overall, the channels by which some countries are connected to Russia, discussed above, 
point out to the potential risk of contagion from the Russian stock market, thereby motivating our 
focus on the change in the degree of co-movement between the Russian and other stock markets.  
 
3 Literature review 
The following section provides a short overview of the literature on financial contagion from 
both theoretical and empirical perspectives. We highlight the models used to test for contagion, 
discuss the methodological issues and present a summary of previous work on this topic. 
 Current empirical studies of financial contagion derive from Sharpe (1964), as well as Grubel 
and Fadner (1971), King and Wadhwani (1990), Engle et al. (1990), Bekaert and Hodrick (1992) 
and, particularly, Forbes and Rigobon (2002). Although financial contagion does not have a widely 
accepted definition, most studies define it as a significant increase in volatility-unbiased cross-market 
movements during a crisis period (e.g. Forbes and Rigobon, 2002, Celik, 2012, Gentile and 
Giordano, 2012). According to the definition used in this paper, contagion only occurs when market 
co-movement increases significantly after the crisis date, defined in our case by Russia’s annexation 
of Crimea5. If the co-movement between markets does not increase significantly, a strong 
interdependence is simply evidence of robust linkages between two economies that exist in all states 
of the world. 
The feature which differentiates the large variety of empirical models on contagion is 
represented by the way in which the available information is used to detect contagion (Dungey et al., 
2005). For example, Favero and Giavazzi (2002) use a set of shift dummies at selected crisis points 
to measure the transmission of contagious shocks. Forbes and Rigobon (2002) use overlapping 
periods and distinct samples to define the pre- and post-crisis periods to test for the presence of 
contagion. Eichengreen et al. (1995, 1996) also make use of binary variables to recognize contagion, 
whereas they provide a transformation of both the dependent and the explanatory variables into 
                                                          
5 Russia’s claims in support of the expropriation of Ukraine’s Crimean territory have taken various forms, however regardless of the claim 
adopted by Russia, its position lacks justification under international law. In fact, under the Charter of the United Nations’ basic principles 
(http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/), states could only use armed forces collectively for security measures (Article 42) or in self-
defense (Article 51). Any other use of forces was defined as a breach of international law: we therefore refer to the event as an annexation 
rather than secession. 
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dummy variables. Bae et al. (2003) add to the Eichengreen et al. (1996) model by allowing for a 
polychotomous explained variable, based on a crisis indicator and the number of its co-exceedances, 
and provide evidence of enhanced model parsimony. A survey of empirical techniques used to 
analyze contagion can be found in Dungey et al. (2010).  
So far, a large number of techniques have been used to measure the transmission of financial 
shocks. These can be classified in the four broad categories: analysis of cross-market correlation 
coefficients, GARCH frameworks, co-integration models and probit models. In this paper we use the 
first two approaches - cross-market correlations are analyzed using the rolling six-monthly window 
correlations, whereas models from the GARCH family are employed to model stock returns and 
volatilities. 
The theoretical literature explaining how shocks spread across international markets is 
similarly well developed. A number of theories exist which hypothesize why contagion could occur. 
Claessens and Forbes (2004) divide this literature into two broad groups. The first group focuses on 
fundamental causes, such as common shocks, trade or financial linkages. The second group pays 
more attention to investors’ behavior, including liquidity concerns, incentive problems, information 
asymmetries, market coordination problems and investor sentiment. We focus on a novel idea of 
contagion because it derives from purely political concerns, thereby feeding into both financial 
markets (equity and currency markets) and international trade markets. Investor behavior represents 
a further repercussion of the political origin of contagion. 
Theories of contagion tend to be categorized as crisis-contingent and non-crisis-contingent.6 
The former are theories that focus on showing why transmission mechanisms are altered during a 
crisis period, hence focusing on the reason for the increase in cross-market linkages after a shock. 
On the other hand, non-crisis-contingent theories assume that pre- and post-crisis transmission 
mechanisms are the same, thus assuming that cross-market links do not increase after a shock.7 
Trade linkages are discussed in many studies, such as Forbes (2002), Hashimoto (2002) and 
Eichengreen et al. (1996). These studies generally find robust evidence that trade and competition 
in third markets are essential in the determination of financial contagion.8 
Relatively few results are widely accepted in the financial literature on contagion. Most 
notably, contagion is more likely to be a regional rather than global phenomenon and is most likely 
to be driven by trade links rather than macroeconomic conditions (Eichengreen et al., 1996). 
Noteworthy empirical work on financial contagion includes King and Wadhwani (1990). Lee and Kim 
(1993) provide the results from the emerging market perspective. Importantly, more recent studies 
are less likely to find evidence of contagion as they take into account the role of the dynamic volatility 
bias (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002). For example, Dimitriou et al. (2014) find that emerging markets 
                                                          
6 A collection of studies on contagion can be found in Claessens and Forbes (2001) and the surveys in Moser (2003) and Forbes (2004). 
A review of the theories of how shocks are propagated internationally can be found in Claessens et al. (2001) and Dornbusch et al. (2000). 
7 For a discussion of financial linkages, see Goldfajn and Valdés (1997) and Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001). 
8 See, for example, Corsetti et al. (2000), Gerlach and Smets (1995), Glick and Rose (1999) and Forbes (2002). 
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were the most affected during the U.S. subprime crisis and provide evidence of the absence of 
contagious effects in the BRICS countries, which rather exhibited signs of decoupling. On the 
contrary, Celik (2012) documents contagious effects for most developed and emerging countries in 
the wake of the recent global financial crisis. 
4 Data and descriptive statistics 
In this paper, we use the stock market indices provided by Morgan Stanley Capital 
International Inc. (MSCI)9. We construct daily continuously compounded return series based on the 
total return indices, which account for reinvested dividends. Our main results are based on the US 
dollar returns to adopt the perspective of an international investor. We also check the robustness of 
our results by using local currency returns.10 
We selected 19 stock market indices for the period November 30, 2007 - April 15, 2015. They 
include eight emerging markets – Brazil, China, Czech Republic, Hungary, India, Poland, Russia 
and Turkey; five frontier markets – Bulgaria, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Romania; and six 
developed markets – France, Germany, The Netherlands, United Kingdom, Japan and the United 
States. We also use data on the MSCI World Index (used as a market benchmark) and The MSCI 
Emerging and Frontier Markets (EFM) Index.11 We use this selection of world markets to provide an 
adequate balance between countries with high and low economic ties to Russia. 
The pre-crisis period is originally defined as the period 1 January 2013 - 28 February 2014, 
whereas the crisis is the period March 1, 2014 - April 15, 2015. To ensure results robustness, we 
shift the two time periods in a variety of ways, in addition to employing a plethora of specifications, 
as described in Section 5. In order to further strengthen our results, we report our main results in 
Section 6, where the pre-crisis period is defined as 1 January 2013 - 28 February 2014 and the crisis 
period as March 1, 2014 - April 15, 2015. In fact, the consideration of the pre-crisis period as including 
the 2008 financial crisis, where correlations were generally very low among countries, should provide 
evidence of contagion most easily with regards to our crisis period. However, we show that this is 
not true, whereby decoupling from Russia represents a generally strong result during the Ukrainian 
crisis. Moreover, the original selection of the pre-crisis period allows for market stabilizations after 
the 2008 global financial crisis. 
Summary statistics for the pre-crisis and the crisis periods are reported in Tables 1 and 2, 
respectively. The descriptive statistics show the first two moments of the returns distribution, as well 
                                                          
9 MSCI is a leading provider of equity, fixed income, and hedge fund indices.  MSCI’s equity indices have become the most 
widely used international equity benchmarks by institutional investors. MSCI’s methodology ensures that the equity index series properly 
represent the markets and reflect their benchmark character. 
10 Various other data and model specifications are used in this study to tackle the issue of robustness. These are explored in section 5. 
11 The MSCI World Index captures large and mid-cap representation across 23 Developed Markets (DM) countries. With 1,643 
constituents, the index covers approximately 85% of the free float-adjusted market capitalization in each country. The MSCI Emerging 
and Frontier Markets (EFM) Index captures large and mid-cap representation across 23 Emerging Markets (EM) countries and 23 Frontier 
Markets (FM) countries. With 959 constituents, the index covers approximately 85% of the free float-adjusted market capitalization in each 
country. 
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as minimum and maximum values, measures of skewness and kurtosis, as well as the Jarque-Bera 
tests for normality of distributions and Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests12. 
 
 
 
 
Index Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis JB ADF 
BRA 0.0000715 0.0242 -0.167 0.181 0.115 13.079 <0.0001 -16.596 
BUL -0.000703 0.0202 -0.167 0.121 -0.969 12.015 <0.0001 -17.998 
CHN 0.0000837 0.0201 -0.1205 0.151 0.318 10.547 <0.0001 -17.057 
CZC -0.0000351 0.0213 -0.154 0.218 0.358 16.505 <0.0001 -15.929 
EST 0.000127 0.0201 -0.0889 0.134 0.386 7.208 <0.0001 -13.908 
HUN -0.000143 0.0285 -0.184 0.225 0.409 9.738 <0.0001 -14.289 
IND 0.0000402 0.0203 -0.113 0.215 0 .554 13.143 <0.0001 -15.435 
KZK 0.0000248 0.0228 -0.134 0.149 0.148 10.976 <0.0001 -16.506 
POL 0.000130 0.0240 -0.125 0.153 -0.013 7.045 <0.0001 -15.339 
ROM -0.0000524 0.0237 -0.271 0.134 -0.947 16.373 <0.0001 -16.307 
RUS -0.0000496 0.0273 -0.226 0.271 .270 19.078 <0.0001 -14.583 
TUR 0.0000159 0.0243 -0.137 0.175 0.074 8.007 <0.0001 -15.048 
UKR -0.00122 0.0252 -0.163 0.259 0.920 19.322 <0.0001 -16.842 
FRA 0.000171 0.0201 -0.109 0.127 0.266 8.296 <0.0001 -18.371 
GER 0.000225 0.0194 -0.0919 0.123 0. 190 7.850 <0.0001 -17.458 
JAP 0.0000897 0.0156 -0.0907 0.122 -0.013 8.573 <0.0001 -19.223 
NED 0.000192 0.0184 -0.108 0.111 0.126 8.617 <0.0001 -17.926 
UK 0.000228 0.0173 -0.0991 0.130 0.185 10.996 <0.0001 -17.986 
US 0.000364 0.0149 -0.0907 0.117 -0.069 11.929 <0.0001 -19.604 
EM/FM 0.0000586 0.0145 -0.0944 0.0999 -0.210 10.440 <0.0001 -13.333 
WLD 0.000215 0.0126 -0.0701 0.0902 -0.276 9.699 <0.0001 -14.630 
 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics: Index returns in the pre-crisis period. The 1%, 5% and 10% critical values for the ADF test 
are -3.457, -2.878 and -2.570, respectively. 
 
 
Index Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis JB ADF 
BRA -0.0000551 0.0219 -0.0608 0.0836 0.265 4.262 0.0028 -17.509 
BUL -0.00177 0.0139 -0.0522 0.0542 0 .071 4.853 0.0011 -19.405 
CHN 0.00132 0.0107 -0.0341 0.0602 0 .565 6.570 <0.0001 -16.550 
CZC -0.000169 0.0107 -0.0322 0.0301 -0.041 3.078 0.8564 -16.506 
EST -0.000912 0.0106 -0.0384 0.0362 0 .004 4.511 0.0042 -16.488 
HUN 0.000439 0.0159 -0.0641 0.0553 0.379 4.713 0.0001 -14.786 
IND 0.00111 0.00957 -0.0339 0.0272 -0.342 3.907 0.0045 -14.115 
KZK -0.000326 0.0214 -0.0994 0.0839 -0.202 6.141 <0.0001 -15.918 
POL -0.00041 0.0107 -0.0604 0.0311 -0.465 6.483 <0.0001 -15.676 
ROM 0.0000941 0.0103 -0.0333 0.0312 0.195 4.001 0.0138 -16.797 
RUS 0.000217 0.0245 -0.122 0.145 0.388 9.646 <0.0001 -15.307 
TUR 0.000554 0.0174 -0.0514 0.0666 0.001 3.578 0.1760 -16.368 
UKR -0.00014 0.0399 -0.294 0.237 -0.317 20.526 <0.0001 -20.493 
FRA 0.00000263 0.00953 -0.0386 0.0333 -0.083 4.303 0.0080 -18.763 
GER 0.000115 0.0101 -0.0358 0.0318 0.080 3.892 0.0399 -19.194 
JAP 0.0005528 0.00974 -0.0268 0.0380 0.160 4.264 0.0065 -20.823 
NED 0.000323 0.00894 -0.0321 0.0292 -0.062 4.211 0.0122 -18.012 
UK -0.00000395 0.00823 -0.0295 0.0314 -0.267 5.999 0.0002 -16.041 
US 0.000555 0.00723 -0.0209 0.0241 -0.193 3.793 0.0310 -17.578 
EM/FM 0.000423 0.00687 -0.0194 0.0192 -0.066 3.043 0.8388 -12.771 
WLD 0.000356 0.00563 -0.0180 0.0192 -0.139 3.921 0.0272 -14.157 
 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics: stock index returns in the crisis period. The 1%, 5% and 10% critical values for the ADF test 
are -3.457, -2.878 and -2.570, respectively. 
 
 
                                                          
12 Appendix Figs. A1-A4 show the index returns series for each of the studied markets. 
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Daily mean returns did not decrease in the crisis period compared to the pre-crisis period, as could 
be expected during a crisis (e.g. Chiang et al., 2007). Instead, returns increased in roughly half of 
the considered markets. Moreover, the variance of returns rose in virtually all markets. The volatility 
of returns increased on average by 54% in the crisis period compared to the pre-crisis period. In 
addition, stock returns minima and maxima rose in nearly all markets. The skewness of stock returns 
increased in the crisis period in 71% of cases, implying an increased frequency of negative returns. 
Finally, kurtosis increased in the crisis period in essentially all cases, with an average increase of 
ca. 51%. This implies that the probability of large positive or negative shocks increased during the 
crisis period. Figures 1-3 illustrate the evolution of daily stock returns in the Russian stock market in 
comparison to a number of developed, emerging, and frontier markets before and during the 
Ukrainian crisis. A simple observation does reveal a significant plunge of the Russian market in the 
crisis period and the resulting changes in the co-movement pattern with other markets. 
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Fig. 1 (upper panel) – Daily returns on the MSCI Russia, the MSCI France, the MSCI Germany, and the MSCI Netherlands 
in the period November 2007-April 2015. In Figs.1-3, the two base dates for the indices are November 1, 2007 and March 
1, 2014. The vertical line indicates the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis (March 1, 2014); Fig. 2 (middle panel) – Daily 
returns on the MSCI Russia, The MSCI France, the MSCI Brazil; Fig. 3 (lower panel) – Daily returns on the MSCI Russia, 
the MSCI Estonia, the MSCI Kazakhstan and the MSCI Ukraine  in the period November 2007-April 2015.  
5 Methodology 
 Forbes and Rigobon (2002) show how tests of financial contagion based on correlation 
coefficients are biased by heteroskedasticity. We use the dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) and 
the varying conditional correlation (VCC) AR-GARCH models, which estimate the correlation 
coefficients of the standardized residuals, thereby accounting for heteroskedasticity directly. The 
DCC-GARCH model continuously and efficiently adjusts the correlation in relation to the time-varying 
volatility thus providing a superior measure for dynamic cross-market correlation compared to other 
empirical models used to test for contagion (Cho and Parhizgari, 2008). An additional advantage of 
our approach is the multivariate nature of our model which enables us to measure the change in 
correlation, between the pre- and post-crisis periods, of a specific risk factor – in our case, the 
possible source of contagion, i.e. the Russian economic downfall – whilst accounting for systematic 
risk factor, represented in our case by the MSCI World Index. As opposed to other models such as 
the VEC and BEKK models (Engle and Kroner, 1995), our model enables the analysis of multiple 
asset returns simultaneously whilst maintaining a parsimonious setting (Chiang et al., 2007). 
MGARCH models mainly differ in the flexibility and parsimony of their specifications for a time-
varying conditional covariance matrix of the disturbances, designated Ht. Such models treat the 
diagonal elements of Ht as univariate GARCH models while the off-diagonal entries are represented 
by nonlinear functions of the diagonal terms. 
The multivariate DCC-GARCH model is specified as:  
ℎ𝑖𝑗,𝑡 = 𝜌𝑖𝑗,𝑡√ℎ𝑖𝑖,𝑡ℎ𝑗𝑗,𝑡             (1) 
where the elements on the main diagonal (ℎ𝑖𝑖,𝑡 and ℎ𝑗𝑗,𝑡) follow univariate GARCH processes and 
the time-varying correlation coefficient 𝜌𝑖𝑗,𝑡 follows the dynamic process discussed in Engle (2002) 
and presented below. The daily mean stock return generating process for market A, 𝑟𝑡
𝐴, in relation 
to each of the 19 international equity markets under analysis, is described by: 
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𝑟𝑡
𝐴 = 𝜔0 + 𝜔1𝑟𝑡−1
𝐴 + 𝜔2𝑟𝑡−1
𝑅𝑈𝑆 + 𝜔3𝑟𝑡−1
𝑊𝐿𝐷 + 𝜀𝑡           (2) 
where 𝑟𝑡
𝐴 is a vector of dependent variables, 𝑟𝑡−1
𝑅𝑈𝑆 is the one-period lagged return from the Russian 
index accounting for idiosyncratic risk and the source of contagion, 𝑟𝑡−1
𝑊𝐿𝐷 represents the systematic 
risk component, 𝑟𝑡−1
𝐴  is an AR(1) term used to account for autocorrelation in stock returns, and 
𝜔0, 𝜔1−3 are the model intercept and unconditional cross-market correlation coefficients to be 
estimated, respectively. More formally, Eq.2 can be expressed in matrix form as 𝑟𝑡
𝐴 = 𝐶𝑥𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡, where 
C is a matrix of parameters, 𝑥𝑡 is a vector of independent variables, which contains one lag of 𝑟𝑡
𝐴 in 
addition to the specific and market risk factors. The contemporary disturbances, 𝜀𝑡, are expressed 
as: 𝜀𝑡 = 𝐻𝑡
1/2𝜐𝑡, where 𝜀𝑡| 𝜑𝑡−1~𝑁(0, 𝐻𝑡) and 𝜐𝑡 is an mx1 vector of normal, independent and 
identically distributed  innovations. 
The multiplicative heteroskedasticity of returns is defined as: 
𝐻𝑡 = 𝐷𝑡
1/2𝑅𝑡𝐷𝑡
1/2                     (3) 
where 𝐻𝑡
1/2 is the Cholesky factor of the time-varying conditional covariance matrix 𝐻𝑡, and R is a 
correlation matrix holding the conditional correlations. We define Dt as: 
𝐷𝑡 = {𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(√ℎ𝑖,𝑡)} = (
𝜎1,𝑡
2
0
⋮
0
  
0
𝜎2,𝑡
2
⋮
0
⋯
⋯
⋱
⋯
0
0
⋮
𝜎𝑚,𝑡
2
)         (4) 
in which 𝜎𝑖,𝑡
2  evolves as a univariate GARCH model of the form: 
𝜎𝑛,𝑡
2 = exp(𝛾𝑖𝑧𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛿1
𝑅𝑈𝑆𝜎1,𝑡−1
2 + 𝛿2
𝑊𝐿𝐷𝜎2,𝑡−1
2 + ∑ 𝛼𝑗
𝑝𝑖
𝑗=1 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−𝑗
2 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗
𝑞𝑖
𝑗=1 𝜎𝑖,𝑡−𝑗
2             (5) 
where the variance of stock returns is dependent on the Russian one-period lagged return variance 
and the world index lagged return, in the basic model13. More specifically, 𝜎𝑛,𝑡
2  is the present variance 
of a single stock return (where n=1…19), 𝛾𝑖(𝑡) is a 1𝑥𝑝 vector of parameters, 𝑧𝑖,𝑡 is a 𝑝𝑥1 vector of 
independent variables, including a constant term, the 𝛼𝑗’s represent ARCH parameters and the 𝛽𝑗’s 
are GARCH parameters. 
The matrix of conditional quasicorrelations introduced in Eq. 3 is given by: 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝑄𝑡)
−1/2𝑄𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔(𝑄𝑡)
−1/2 = (
1
𝜌12,𝑡
⋮
𝜌1𝑚,𝑡
  
𝜌12,𝑡
1
⋮
0
⋯
⋯
⋱
⋯
𝜌1𝑚,𝑡
𝜌2𝑚,𝑡
⋮
1
)                   (7) 
In the case in which non-concave or discontinuous regions of likelihood functions are met in the 
estimation of the multiplicative heteroskedasticity, we estimate the following equation (i.e., without 
exogenous variables in Eq. 5), ensuring differentiability. Although this process may worsen the 
specification of our model it improves parsimony: 
𝜎1,𝑡
2 = 𝑐𝑖 + ∑ 𝛼𝑗
𝑝𝑖
𝑗=1 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−𝑗
2 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗
𝑞𝑖
𝑗=1 𝜎𝑖,𝑡−𝑗
2                   (6) 
                                                          
13 We also use interest and exchange rates in other specifications of both the returns and their multiplicative heeroscedasticity, yielding 
consistent results. Due to space constraints, this study only reports the results obtained throughout the basic model, explained through 
Eq. 1-10; Results relating to similar models employed in the study can be made available upon request. 
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where p and q represent the order of the AR-GARCH(1,1) model, ascertained using AIC and BIC. In 
Eq. 7, 𝑄𝑡 is specified as follows: 
𝑄𝑡 = (1 − 𝜆1 − 𝜆2)𝑅 + 𝜆1𝜀?̃?−1𝜀?̃?−1 + 𝜆2𝑄𝑡−1                               (8) 
where 𝜀?̃? is a vector of standardized residuals, 𝐷𝑡
−1/2𝜀𝑡 and 𝜆1 and 𝜆2 are parameters governing the 
dynamics of the conditional quasicorrelations; 𝜆1 and 𝜆2 are non-negative and satisfy 0 ≤ 𝜆1+𝜆1 < 1 
in a stable solution. 
When 𝑄𝑡−1is verified as stationary, the matrix R in (7) becomes a weighted average of the 
unconditional covariance matrix (𝑅𝑡) of the standardized residuals, 𝜀?̃? , and the unconditional mean 
of 𝑄𝑡, i.e. 𝑄𝑡. Given that 𝑅 ≠ 𝑄, it is safe to state that R neither represents the unconditional 
correlation matrix, nor the unconditional mean of 𝑄𝑡, thus we can identify them as quasicorrelations, 
these being crucial toward the estimation of our model. 
 The various DCC MGARCH models for each market, using subsamples relating to the pre- 
and post-crisis periods, are then estimated by maximum likelihood. Because the 𝜐𝑡’s are assumed 
to follow a multivariate t-distribution with more than two degrees of freedom (df), the log-likelihood 
function for the tth observation is given by: 
𝑙𝑡 = log Г (
𝑑𝑓 + 𝑚
2
) − log Г (
𝑑𝑓
2
) −
𝑚
2
log{(𝑑𝑓 − 2)π} 
−0.5log{det(𝑅𝑡)} − log {det (𝐷𝑡
1
2)} −
𝑑𝑓+𝑚
2
log (1 +
?̃?𝑡𝑅𝑡
−1?̃?𝑡
′
𝑑𝑓−2
)         (9) 
We perform the first optimization step in the unconstrained space. Once a maximum is found, we 
impose the constraints 𝜆1 ≥ 0, 𝜆2 ≥ 0, and 0 ≤ 𝜆1+𝜆1 < 1, as before, to then maximize the log-
likelihood in the constrained space. Our estimation method requires initial values that can be plugged 
in for 𝜀𝑡−𝑖𝜀𝑡−𝑖
′ and H𝑡−𝑗 when 𝑡 − 𝑖 < 1 and 𝑡 − 𝑗 < 1, thus we substitute an estimator of the 
unconditional covariance of the disturbances: 
Σ̂ = T−1 ∑ 𝜀?̂?𝜀?̂?′
𝑇
𝑡=1              (10) 
for 𝜀𝑡−𝑖𝜀𝑡−𝑖
′ when 𝑡 − 𝑖 < 1 and for H𝑡−𝑗 when 𝑡 − 𝑗 < 1, where 𝜀?̂? represents the vector of residuals 
previously calculated using the estimated parameters. 
 We also test for robustness of our results by employing a variety of model and data 
specifications. Relating to the former, we use: the simplest AR(1)-GARCH(1,1) model of Bollerslev 
(1990), the asymmetric GARCH model – used to account for the possibility of asymmetric 
innovations – and the VCC MGARCH model by Tse and Tsui (2002), in which the conditional 
correlations at each period are given by a weighted sum of a time-invariant component, a measure 
of recent correlations among the residuals, and the last period’s conditional correlations. In order to 
ensure parsimony, we impose a restriction on the conditional correlations to follow the same 
dynamics. Furthermore, the asymmetric GARCH model specifies the simple asymmetric ARCH 
terms. By adding these terms we are making the standard GARCH model respond asymmetrically 
to positive and negative innovations. 
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 On the other hand, we also employ a series of data specifications to confirm the robustness 
of our results. These include using interest and exchange rates, oil prices and volume of trading in 
both the mean and variance equations as control variables. In addition, we employ variables defined 
as local returns, 6-monthly rolling average returns and weekly returns. We also employ zero, one or 
five lags to describe the mean and variance of stock returns. We additionally study equal time lengths 
for the pre-crisis and the crisis period and also shift such periods by one month in both directions 
until the periods may not provide equal number of observations. 
We derive the coefficient of dynamic correlation, 𝜔2, attached to the Russian stock return, 
𝑟𝑡−1
𝑅𝑈𝑆, from the DCC model and test, via the Fisher Z-transformation, whether a statistically significant 
change occurred in the coefficient after the crisis period. The correlation coefficient 𝜔2, expressed 
in terms of country i, (the affected market) and country j (the source of contagion, in our case the 
Russian market) is given by: 
𝜔𝑖𝑗,𝑡 =
(1−𝜆1−𝜆2)ℎ̅𝑖𝑗+𝜆1𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1𝜀𝑗,𝑡−1+𝜆2ℎ̅𝑖𝑗,𝑡−1
[(1−𝜆1−𝜆2)ℎ̅𝑖𝑖+𝜆1𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1
2 +𝜆2ℎ𝑖𝑖,𝑡−1]
0.5
[(1−𝜆1−𝜆2)ℎ̅𝑗𝑗+𝜆1𝜀𝑗,𝑡−1
2 +𝜆2ℎ𝑗𝑗,𝑡−1]
0.5 .         (11) 
Where all parameters are specified throughout Eq. 1-10 and we refer to the DCC-MGARCH mean 
model specified in Eq.2. The t-statistics on the coefficient 𝜔𝑖𝑗,𝑡 is used to find the degree of correlation 
for each market. The null and alternative hypotheses are defined as: 
𝐻0 = 𝜔𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑖𝑙
𝑅𝑈𝑆 = 𝜔𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒
𝑅𝑈𝑆  ;   𝐻1 = 𝜔𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑖𝑙
𝑅𝑈𝑆 ≠ 𝜔𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒
𝑅𝑈𝑆                        (12) 
where 𝜔𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑖𝑙
𝑅𝑈𝑆  and 𝜔𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒
𝑅𝑈𝑆  are the dynamic correlation coefficients observed in the two periods. 
Assuming independence between the sample coefficients, we test for the difference in correlation 
over the two periods. This requires the computation of Fisher’s transform, a variance-stabilizing 
transformation of the correlation coefficient between the market return in question and the 
explanatory return when the two time series follow a bivariate normal distribution. We first convert 
each coefficient into a z-score using an inverse hyperbolic tangent and derive z as: 
𝑧 = 0.5 ln
1+𝜔𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑖𝑙
𝑅𝑈𝑆
1−𝜔𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑖𝑙
𝑅𝑈𝑆 = arctanh (𝜔𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑖𝑙
𝑅𝑈𝑆 ) .          (13) 
We then consider the sample sizes for each period, 𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑖𝑙 and 𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒, to compare the obtained z-
scores:  
𝑧 =
𝑧′𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑖𝑙−𝑧′𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒
[(𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑖𝑙−3)+(𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒−3)]0.5
 .           (14) 
If 𝑧 > 1.65, then 𝑝 < 0.05, indicating a significant change in the correlation coefficient from the stable 
to the turmoil period. In these cases, we derive the rates of change ∆𝐴,𝑅= (𝜔𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑚𝑜𝑖𝑙
𝑅𝑈𝑆 −
𝜔𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒
𝑅𝑈𝑆 )/𝜔𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒
𝑅𝑈𝑆 , where financial contagion from Russia to country A is defined as ∆𝐴,𝑅> 0. If ∆𝐴,𝑅<
0, we acknowledge evidence of decoupling, signaling the falling influence of the Russian equity 
market, whereas if ∆𝐴,𝑅= 0, the degree of correlation between Russia and country A is stationary. It 
is reasonable to hypothesize that during any turmoil period or crisis, correlations are expected to 
increase (Dimson et al., 2014). 
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6 Results 
Our use of the DCC-MGARCH model enabled us to dynamically control for volatility biases. 
The following tables report the results of this analysis. The unconditional correlations, before and 
during the crisis period, relate daily returns of the MSCI Russia Index with those observed in the 
developed Western markets (Table 3), the major Asian equity markets (Table 4), the emerging 
markets (Table 5) and the frontier markets (Table 6). 
 
Developed 
markets 
FRA GER NED UK USA 
Pre-crisis  Crisis Pre-crisis  Crisis Pre-crisis  Crisis Pre-crisis  Crisis Pre-crisis  Crisis 
Mean model 
RUSSIA 
0.124*** 
(0.0134) 
P<0.0001 
-0.0304** 
(0.0155) 
P=0.049 
0.146*** 
(0.0133) 
P<0.0001 
-0.0304** 
(0.0155) 
P=0.049 
0.110*** 
(0.0138) 
P<0.0001 
0.00866 
(0.0186) 
P=0.641 
0.118*** 
(0.0115) 
P<0.0001 
0.00507 
(0.0145) 
P=0.727 
0.133*** 
(0.0087) 
P<0.0001 
-0.0219*** 
(0.0841) 
P=0.009 
WORLD 
1.264*** 
(0.0303) 
P<0.0001 
1.336*** 
(0.0747) 
P<0.0001 
1.161*** 
(0.0282) 
P<0.0001 
1.336*** 
(0.0747) 
P<0.0001 
1.127*** 
(0.0289) 
P<0.0001 
1.1099*** 
(0.0747) 
P<0.0001 
1.016*** 
(0.0248) 
P<0.0001 
1.0387*** 
(0.0652) 
P<0.0001 
1.148*** 
(0.0186) 
P<0.0001 
1.149*** 
(0.0386) 
P<0.0001 
Constant 
-0.000269 
(0.000199) 
P=0.176 
-0.000451 
(0.000311) 
P=0.148 
-0.000054 
(0.000193) 
P=0.778 
-0.00045 
(0.00031) 
P=0.148 
-0.000051 
(0.000196) 
P=0.799 
-0.000064 
(0.000307) 
P=0.834 
-0.00013 
(0.00016) 
P=0.394 
-0.00038 
(0.00028) 
P=0.169 
0.000052 
(0.00011) 
P=0.649 
0.0001704 
(0.000162) 
P=0.292 
Multiplicative heteroskedasticity model 
arch 
0.05005** 
(0.02006) 
P=0.014 
0.1805*** 
(0.0696) 
P=0.010 
0.0679*** 
(0.0111) 
P<0.0001 
0.1805*** 
(0.0696) 
P=0.010 
0.0509*** 
(0.0104) 
P<0.0001 
0.134*** 
(0.0475) 
P=0.005 
0.0636*** 
(0.0157) 
P<0.0001 
0.143*** 
(0.0441) 
P<0.0001 
0.071*** 
(0.0157) 
P<0.0001 
0.244** 
(0.986) 
P=0.013 
garch 
0.836*** 
(0.0366) 
P<0.0001 
0.712*** 
(0.1015) 
P<0.0001 
0.918*** 
(0.0128) 
P<0.0001 
0.712*** 
(0.102) 
P<0.0001 
0.925*** 
(0.0126) 
P<0.0001 
0.844*** 
(0.0498) 
P<0.0001 
0.845*** 
(0.0267) 
P<0.0001 
0.779*** 
(0.0668) 
P<0.0001 
0.854*** 
(0.0239) 
P<0.0001 
0.534** 
(0.252) 
P=0.034 
RUSSIA 
-1.368 
(4.304) 
P=0.751 
   
4.683 
(3.396) 
P=0.168 
 
-6.213 
(5.803) 
P=0.230 
 
-2.034 
(7.545) 
P=0.787 
 
WORLD 
-77.047*** 
(8.0566) 
P<0.0001 
   
69.717*** 
(6.694) 
P<0.0001 
 
-76.068*** 
(9.9602) 
P<0.0001 
 
-85.194*** 
(12.638) 
P<0.0001 
 
Constant 
-12.075*** 
(0.2138) 
P<0.0001 
4.33 e-6* 
(5.4 e-6) 
P=0.088 
1.25 e-6*** 
(4.24 e-7) 
P=0.003 
4.33 e-6* 
(2.54 e-6) 
P=0.088 
-13.609*** 
(0.308) 
P<0.0001 
1.16 e-6 
(8.67 e-7) 
P=0.181 
-12.742*** 
(0.211) 
P<0.0001 
2.49 e-6** 
(1.27 e-6) 
P=0.05 
-13.572*** 
(0.223) 
P<0.0001 
2.34 e-6 
(1.89 e-6) 
P=0.216 
Model diagnostics 
arch+garch           
Wald 2 
4034.03*** 
P<0.0001 
400.67*** 
P<0.0001 
4013.76*** 
P<0.0001 
400.67*** 
P<0.0001 
3618.35*** 
P<0.0001 
294.50*** 
P<0.0001 
4353.32*** 
P<0.0001 
324.97*** 
P<0.0001 
5348.77*** 
P<0.0001 
1079.97*** 
P<0.0001 
LL 5403.633 1080.660 5412.983 1080. 66 5431.483 1086.311 5712.604 1120.686 6198.925 1277.759 
AIC -10791.27 -2149.320 -10813.97 
-
2149.320 
-10846.97 -2160.622 -11409.21 -2229.372 -12381.85 -2453.518 
BIC -10748.10 -2127.259 -10781.59 
-
2127.259 
-10803.80 -2138.562 -11366.04 -2207.311 -12338.68 -2521.457 
 
Table 3 – Developed markets. Correlation of MSCI index returns for France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom and the US with the MSCI Russia and the MSCI World, during the pre-crisis and the crisis periods. Dynamic 
conditional correlation AR(1)-MGARCH(1,1) mean and variance model parameters and diagnostics are reported. Standard 
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errors are given in brackets. The pre-crisis and the crisis periods are November 2007-February 2014 and March 2014-
April 2015, respectively. 
  
The results depicted in Table 3 show that the dynamic correlations between the Russian 
market and the developed markets significantly decreased in the crisis period, except for the 
Netherlands and the UK, where the decrease in correlation was insignificant. The drop in return 
correlations of the Russian market with the French, German, and the US markets was very large 
and ranged from 75.5 to 84%. In fact, the correlations of the returns in these markets with the Russian 
market turned from positive to negative, potentially suggesting increased diversification possibilities.  
On the other hand, the source of market risk for each of the developed markets in our sample was 
significant both before and during the crisis. The correlation of the MSCI World Index returns with 
the developed markets increased in all cases during the crisis, except for the Netherlands; this 
correlation increased by 5.7% in France, 15.07% in Germany, 2.23% in the UK and 8.7% in the US. 
 
Other major 
financial markets 
IND CHN JAP EM/FM 
Pre-crisis  Crisis Pre-crisis  Crisis Pre-crisis  Crisis Pre-crisis  Crisis 
Mean model 
RUSSIA 
0.164*** 
(0.032) 
P<0.0001 
0.066** 
(0.029) 
P=0.025 
0.167*** 
(0.031) 
P<0.0001 
0.049* 
(0.028) 
P=0.080 
-0.028 
(0.023) 
P=0.222 
0.0092 
(0.023) 
P=0.685 
0.195*** 
(0.0122) 
P<0.0001 
0.106*** 
(0.0196) 
P<0.0001 
WORLD 
0.547*** 
(0.068) 
P<0.0001 
0.387*** 
(0.121) 
P=0.001 
0.510*** 
(0.057) 
P<0.0001 
0.497*** 
(0.098) 
P<0.0001 
0.428*** 
(0.046) 
P<0.0001 
0.341*** 
(0.117) 
P=0.004 
0.641*** 
(0.0242) 
P<0.0001 
0.545*** 
(0.083) 
P<0.0001 
Constant 
-0.00011 
(0.00033) 
P=0.727 
0.0011** 
(0.00050) 
P=0.022 
-0.000096 
(0.00031) 
P=0.756 
0.00075 
(0.00055) 
P=0.173 
0.00041 
(0.00028) 
P=0.152 
0.00058 
(0.00045) 
P=0.192 
-0.000049 
(0.00014) 
P=0.732 
0.00027 
(0.00029) 
P=0.345 
Multiplicative heteroskedasticity model 
arch 
0.068*** 
(0.025) 
P=0.007 
0.033*** 
(0.003) 
P<0.0001 
0.0501*** 
(0.014) 
P<0.0001 
0.083*** 
(0.0298) 
P=0.005 
0.089*** 
(0.024) 
P<0.0001 
0.059** 
(0.029) 
P=0.044 
0.040*** 
(0.010) 
P<0.0001 
0.024*** 
(0.008) 
P<0.0001 
garch 
0.925*** 
(0.0195) 
P<0.0001 
0. 760*** 
(0.041) 
P<0.0001 
0.922*** 
(0.021) 
P<0.0001 
0.816*** 
(0.048) 
P<0.0001 
0.832*** 
(0.046) 
P<0.0001 
0.887*** 
(0.335) 
P<0.0001 
0.917*** 
(0.021) 
P<0.0001 
0.962*** 
(0.31) 
P=0.004 
RUSSIA 
3.433 
(5.039) 
P=0.496 
33.747*** 
(6.885) 
P<0.0001 
-9.655 
(6.135) 
P=0.116 
16.687** 
(8.428) 
P=0.048 
16.054* 
(8.903) 
P=0.071 
19.759* 
(11.001) 
P=0.072 
-4.002 
(4.706) 
P=0.393 
-5.781 
(6.885) 
P=0.401 
WORLD 
69.699*** 
(10.116) 
P<0.0001 
-187.034*** 
(34.747) 
P<0.0001 
-62.244*** 
(13.663) 
P<0.0001 
2.839 
(55.352) 
P=0.959 
-87.557*** 
(10.377) 
P<0.0001 
-274.412*** 
(51.727) 
P<0.0001 
-72.480*** 
(9.412) 
P<0.0001 
-158.147 
(156.899) 
P=0.313 
Constant 
-13.299*** 
(0.547) 
P<0.0001 
-11.513*** 
(0.362) 
P<0.0001 
-12.541*** 
(0.442) 
P<0.0001 
-11.529*** 
(0.491) 
P<0.0001 
-11.518*** 
(0.403) 
P<0.0001 
-13.441*** 
(0.687) 
P<0.0001 
-13.706*** 
(0.351) 
P<0.0001 
-14.0.62** 
(5.760) 
P=0.015 
Model diagnostics 
arch+garch 0.993 0.793 0.972 0.899 0.921 0.946 0.957 0.986 
Wald 2 
405.84*** 
P<0.0001 
33.43*** 
P<0.0001 
401.26*** 
P<0.0001 
47.12*** 
P<0.0001 
146.23*** 
P<0.0001 
12.90*** 
P=0.0016 
3044.67*** 
P<0.0001 
214.22*** 
P<0.0001 
LL 4493.73 978.274 4607.881 936.427 4769.565 968.236 5903.811 1142.798 
AIC -8971.460 -1940.549 -9199.762 -1856.853 -9523.13 -1920.471 -11791.620 -2269.596 
BIC -8928.289 -1911.135 -9156.591 -1827.439 -9479.96 -1891.057 -11748.450 -2240.282 
 
Table 4 – Asian markets. Correlation of MSCI index returns for India, China, Japan and The MSCI Emerging and Frontier 
Markets (EFM) Index with the MSCI Russia and the MSCI World, during the pre-crisis and the crisis periods. Dynamic 
conditional correlation AR(1)-MGARCH(1,1) mean and variance model parameters and diagnostics are reported. Standard 
errors are given in brackets. The pre-crisis and the crisis periods are November 2007-February 2014 and March 2014-
April 2015, respectively. 
 
  
As can be seen in Table 4, the dynamic correlations between the MSCI Russia Index and 
the MSCI indices of India, China, and the MSCI Emerging and Frontier Markets (EFM) Index 
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decreased considerably during the crisis period, with the decrease in correlation ranging from 47% 
to 71%. The case of Japan, on the other hand, does not suggest a large change in correlation.14 
The returns in all markets also exhibit decreased correlation with the MSCI World, though one of a 
smaller magnitude comparing to the decrease in correlation with the Russian market.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Emerging 
markets 
HUN POL CZC BRA TUR 
Pre-crisis  Crisis Pre-crisis  Crisis Pre-crisis  Crisis Pre-crisis  Crisis Pre-crisis  Crisis 
Mean model 
RUSSIA 
0.323*** 
(0.032) 
P<0.0001 
0.304*** 
(0.115) 
P=0.008 
0.345*** 
(0.029) 
P<0.0001 
0.061 
(0.057) 
P=0.286 
0.284*** 
(0.024) 
P<0.0001 
0.042 
(0.033) 
P=0.201 
0.087*** 
(0.019) 
P<0.0001 
0.192*** 
(0.021) 
P<0.0001 
0.293*** 
(0.028) 
P<0.0001 
0.195*** 
(0.053) 
P<0.0001 
WORLD 
1.137*** 
(0.069) 
P<0.0001 
0.594*** 
(0.203) 
P=0.004 
0.969*** 
(0.055) 
P<0.0001 
0.807*** 
(0.133) 
P<0.0001 
0.556*** 
(0.050) 
P<0.0001 
0.496*** 
(0.122) 
P<0.0001 
1.332*** 
(0.0414) 
P<0.0001 
1.336*** 
(0.044) 
P<0.0001 
0.742*** 
(0.060) 
P<0.0001 
0.732*** 
(0.220) 
P=0.001 
Constant 
-0.00022 
(0.00038) 
P=0.568 
0.00041 
(0.0077) 
P=0.597 
0.000034 
(0.00030) 
P=0.909 
-0.00073 
(0.00053) 
P=0.172 
-0.00011 
(0.00030) 
P=0.724 
0.00017 
(0.00058) 
P=0.768 
-0.000245 
(0.00028) 
P=0.386 
-0.00033 
(0.00096) 
P=0.732 
0.00042 
(0.00037) 
P=0.243 
0.000363 
(0.00093) 
P=0.696 
Multiplicative heteroskedasticity model 
arch 
0.064*** 
(0.019) 
P=0.001 
0.091** 
(0.038) 
P=0.032 
0.058*** 
(0.018) 
P=0.002 
0.027*** 
(0.009) 
P=0.001 
0.039** 
(0.017) 
P=0.022 
0.034** 
(0.012) 
P=0.020 
0.143*** 
(0.0515) 
P=0.005 
0.043** 
(0.017) 
P=0.049 
0.060*** 
(0.016) 
P<0.0001 
0.050*** 
(0.014) 
P<0.0001 
garch 
0.871*** 
(0.033) 
P<0.0001 
0.627*** 
(0.041) 
P<0.0001 
0.899*** 
(0.026) 
P<0.0001 
0.896*** 
(0.190) 
P<0.0001 
0.910*** 
(0.029) 
P<0.0001 
0.799*** 
(0.128) 
P<0.0001 
0.548*** 
(0.115) 
P<0.0001 
0.892*** 
(0.0459) 
P<0.0001 
0.910*** 
(0.024) 
P<0.0001 
0.714*** 
(0.159) 
P<0.0001 
RUSSIA 
14.011** 
(5.697) 
P=0.014 
29.413*** 
(7.028) 
P<0.0001 
-9.011 
(10.329) 
P=0.383 
 
-18.361*** 
(6.265) 
P=0.003 
30.356*** 
(5.778) 
P<0.0001 
-11.825 
(12.474) 
P=0.343 
-4.965 
(7.615) 
P=0.514 
12.382 
(8.462) 
P=0.143 
8.897 
(7.394) 
P=0.229 
WORLD 
-90.600*** 
(7.675) 
P<0.0001 
-69.610*** 
(49.988) 
P<0.0001 
-59.458*** 
(22.562) 
P=0.008 
 
-35.826*** 
(15.534) 
P=0.003 
-138.75*** 
(42.094) 
P=0.001 
-52.463* 
(27.102) 
P=0.053 
-178.298*** 
(40.934) 
P<0.0001 
-73.743*** 
(10.078) 
P<0.0001 
-48.349 
(42.883) 
P=0.260 
Constant 
-11.210*** 
(0.339) 
P<0.0001 
-9.966*** 
(0.694) 
P<0.0001 
-12.091*** 
(0.336) 
P<0.0001 
6.43 e-06 
(0.000015) 
P=0.662 
-11.999*** 
(0.381) 
P<0.0001 
-11.265*** 
(0.743) 
P<0.0001 
-10.340*** 
(0.229) 
P<0.0001 
-11.399*** 
(0.656) 
P<0.0001 
-11.883*** 
(0.467) 
P<0.0001 
-9.783*** 
(0.649) 
P<0.0001 
Model diagnostics 
arch+garch 0.935 0.718 0.957 0.923 0.949 0.833 0.691 0.935 0.970 0.764 
Wald 2 
1041.30*** 
P<0.0001 
47.06*** 
P<0.0001 
1382.80*** 
P<0.0001 
74.01*** 
P<0.0001 
852.57*** 
P<0.0001 
25.85*** 
P<0.0001 
2505.57*** 
P<0.0001 
85.56*** 
P<0.0001 
946.52*** 
P<0.0001 
60.81*** 
P<0.0001 
LL 4295.548 839.889 4664.697 956.928 4746.603 934.433 4810.817 777.188 4362.882 803.109 
AIC -8575.095 -1663.777 -9313.394 -1901.856 -9477.207 -1852.867 -9745.830 -1538.376 -8709.764 -1590.218 
BIC -8531.924 -1634.363 -9270.223 -1879.795 -9434.036 -1832.453 -9702.659 -1508.962 -8666.593 -1560.804 
 
Table 5 – Emerging markets. Correlation of MSCI index returns for Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Brazil and Turkey 
with the MSCI Russia and the MSCI World, during the pre-crisis and the crisis periods. Dynamic conditional correlation 
AR(1)-MGARCH(1,1) mean and variance model parameters and diagnostics are reported. Standard errors are given in 
brackets. The pre-crisis and the crisis periods are November 2007-February 2014 and March 2014-April 2015, respectively. 
 
 
As shown in Table 5, Brazil is the only country to show evidence of contagious effects from 
Russia. In fact, prior to the Ukrainian crisis, a 1% increase in the Russian equity return was 
associated with a 8.7% increase in the Brazilian stock return, whereas after the crisis this association 
                                                          
14 Note that the formal tests to detect correlation changes are reported in the next section. Appendix Tables A9 and A10 show the values 
of the information criteria for each model type in relation to both time periods. 
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increased to 19.2%. Brazil and Russia were among the ten worst performing markets in 2014 so the 
increase in correlation between these markets’ returns in the crisis period could be explained by 
idiosyncratic downside risk factors occurring simultaneously, as well as by a similar exposure of both 
countries to decline in oil prices. As for other emerging markets, Hungary and Turkey did not exhibit 
any change in their relationship with the Russian market. In Czech Republic and Poland, correlations 
have dropped considerably although their coefficients do not imply reliability due to their large 
standard errors and thus inconclusive test statistics. With regards to the world return, correlations 
decreased in all markets except Brazil, where we were only able to observe a small decrease (-
0.3%). Correlations have notably decreased for: Hungary (ca. 47.8%), Poland (16.7%), Czech 
Republic (10.8%) and Turkey (1.3%). 
 
Frontier 
markets 
ROM BUL KZK UKR EST 
Pre-crisis  Crisis Pre-crisis  Crisis Pre-crisis  Crisis Pre-crisis  Crisis Pre-crisis  Crisis 
Mean model 
RUSSIA 
0.306*** 
(0.033) 
P<0.0001 
0.004 
(0.026) 
P=0.882 
0.140*** 
(0.026) 
P<0.0001 
-0.038 
(0.041) 
P=0.356 
0.321*** 
(0.030) 
P<0.0001 
0.037 
(0.064) 
P=0.563 
0.232*** 
(0.034) 
P<0.0001 
-0.102 
(0.300) 
P=0.733 
0.129*** 
(0.030) 
P<0.0001 
-0.0156 
(0.0292) 
P=0.591 
WORLD 
0.622*** 
(0.070) 
P<0.0001 
0.581*** 
(0.109) 
P<0.0001 
0.366*** 
(0.054) 
P<0.0001 
0.154 
(0.155) 
P=0.318 
0.157** 
(0.062) 
P=0.012 
0.629*** 
(0.177) 
P<0.0001 
0.292*** 
(0.067) 
P<0.0001 
0.641 
(0.646) 
P=0.321 
0.470*** 
(0.0558) 
P<0.0001 
0.505*** 
(0.116) 
P<0.0001 
Constant 
0.00011 
(0.0004) 
P=0.786 
-0.00029 
(0.00054) 
P=0.587 
-0.00068* 
(0.00037) 
P=0.069 
-0.0016** 
(0.0007) 
P=0.033 
0.00018 
(0.00038) 
P=0.622 
0.00048 
(0.00077) 
P=0.536 
-0.00148*** 
(0.00042) 
P<0.0001 
0.00466 
(0.00606) 
P=0.442 
-0.00003 
(0.00035) 
P=0.929 
-0.0012** 
(0.0006) 
P=0.047 
Multiplicative heteroskedasticity model 
arch 
0.026** 
(0.0126) 
P=0.040 
0.023*** 
(0.0038) 
P<0.0001 
0.068*** 
(0.0169) 
P<0.0001 
0.095** 
(0.045) 
P=0.049 
0.079** 
(0.028) 
P=0.005 
0.092** 
(0.040) 
P=0.049 
0.176*** 
(0.0390) 
P<0.0001 
1.212 
(2.071) 
P=0.558 
0.0995** 
(0.023) 
P=0.035 
0.0921** 
(0.025) 
P=0.037 
garch 
0.956*** 
(0.015) 
P<0.0001 
0.885*** 
(0.091) 
P<0.0001 
0.866*** 
(0.040) 
P<0.0001 
0.811*** 
(0.053) 
P<0.0001 
0.859*** 
(0.042) 
P<0.0001 
0.843*** 
(0.066) 
P<0.0001 
0.807*** 
(0.041) 
P<0.0001 
-0.020** 
(0.009) 
P=0.038 
0.868*** 
(0.072) 
P<0.0001 
0.732*** 
(0.041) 
P<0.0001 
RUSSIA 
4.873 
(3.371) 
P=0.148 
26.75** 
(9.073) 
P=0.003 
-22.269*** 
(4.537) 
P<0.0001 
28.321*** 
(7.929) 
P<0.0001 
15.783** 
(6.713) 
P=0.019 
-44.28*** 
(6.802) 
P<0.0001 
7.744* 
(4.093) 
P=0.059 
- 
25.342*** 
(5.524) 
P<0.0001 
3.937 
(10.586) 
P=0.710 
WORLD 
77.386*** 
(15.221) 
P<0.0001 
-57.39 
(48.99) 
P=0.241 
-25.01 
(16.248) 
P=0.124 
-70.44 
(45.90) 
P=0.125 
-94.719*** 
(8.845) 
P<0.0001 
-112.059 
(98.179) 
P=0.254 
55.820*** 
(17.005) 
P=0.001 
- 
-55.626 
(37.776) 
P=0.141 
-45.040** 
(11.587) 
P=0.041 
Constant 
-12.791*** 
(0.468) 
P<0.0001 
-11.85*** 
(1.18) 
P<0.0001 
11.287*** 
(0.469) 
P<0.0001 
-11.08*** 
(0.430) 
P<0.0001 
-11.347*** 
(0.396) 
P<0.0001 
-11.689*** 
(0.823) 
P<0.0001 
-11.359*** 
(0.518) 
P<0.0001 
- 
-11.580*** 
(0.811) 
P<0.0001 
-9.681*** 
(0.736) 
P<0.0001 
Model diagnostics 
arch+garch 0.982 0.908 0.934 0.906 0.938 0.935 0.983 1.192 0.9675 0.8241 
Wald 2 
476.31*** 
P<0.0001 
40.08*** 
P<0.0001 
24.44*** 
P<0.0001 
25.25*** 
P<0.0001 
303.63*** 
P<0.0001 
15.32*** 
P=0.0005 
146.77*** 
P<0.0001 
1.68*** 
P=0.4324 
223.81*** 
P<0.0001 
21.82*** 
P<0.0001 
LL 4328.399 947.164 4431.028 843.87 4397.688 770.573 4170.701 564.1303 4414.584 928.133 
AIC -8640.797 -1878.329 -8846.056 -1671.743 -8779.376 -1525.146 -8325.402 -1116.261 -8813.168 -1840.266 
BIC -8597.626 -1848.915 -8802.886 -1642.329 -8736.206 -1495.732 -8282.231 -1094.200 -8769.997 -1810.852 
 
Table 6 – Frontier markets. Correlation of MSCI index returns for Romania, Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Estonia 
with the MSCI Russia and the MSCI World, during the pre-crisis and the crisis periods. Dynamic conditional correlation 
AR(1)-MGARCH(1,1) mean and variance model parameters and diagnostics are reported. Standard errors are given in 
brackets. The pre-crisis and the crisis periods are November 2007-February 2014 and March 2014-April 2015, respectively. 
 
 
Table 6 shows the unconditional correlations of five frontier markets and the Russian equity 
market before and during the crisis. It is remarkable how correlations have dropped in all cases; 
most of the correlations even become negative and insignificant during the crisis. Moreover, 
correlations with the world return decreased by ca. 7% in Romania and increased by a similar extent 
in Estonia. Estonia became substantially more associated with the world during the crisis. This is 
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even more the case in Kazakhstan, which was expected to show even tighter links to the Russian 
market.  
Having used a DCC MGARCH model to derive the correlations between Russian stock 
returns and the returns observed in our sample of international markets, we now turn to testing for 
the presence of significant changes in correlation using Fisher’s z-transformation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 Tests of contagion. Fisher’s transformation is applied to test for a change in the dynamic correlation between the 
crisis country (Russia) and the 18 international markets. N indicates that no contagion was detected. Asterisks indicate 
that the change in correlation over the two periods is statistically significant (z>1.65 and t>1.65 for MGARCH coefficients 
in both periods) at the 5% level. 
 
 
The relationships characterized by significant changes in correlation with the Russian market 
are denoted with asterisks in Table 7. According to our results, the most pronounced international 
trend seems to be that of the Russian market decoupling from other countries15. This is true in 83% 
of all significant instances of the recorded changes in correlation. In most cases, decoupling seems 
to have occurred but cannot be directly confirmed due to the MGARCH coefficient on the Russian 
return becoming insignificant in the crisis period. Given that, in many cases, correlation coefficients 
are still positive after the crisis, this result possibly implying that the MSCI Russia returns lost any 
explanatory power in the crisis period. To this extent, the Russian market showed signs of decoupling 
                                                          
15 This result is also confirmed by the rolling six-monthly correlations, shown in Figs. A5-A8, which suggest a falling correlation between the Russian 
market and the majority of other markets. 
Index 
Pre-crisis  Crisis 
z 
Decoupling (D), 
Contagion (C) ρ σ ρ σ 
JAP -0.028 0.023 0.092 0.023 -1.88 C 
BRA 0.087 0.019 0.192 0.021 -1.68 C* 
ROM 0.306 0.033 0.004 0.026 4.89 D 
BUL 0.140 0.026 -0.038 0.041 2.80 D 
KZK 0.321 0.030 0.037 0.064 4.63 D 
UKR 0.232 0.034 -0.102 0.300 5.31 D 
CZC 0.284 0.024 0.042 0.033 3.92 D 
EST 0.129 0.030 -0.016 0.0292 2.28 D 
POL 0.345 0.029 0.061 0.057 4.68 D 
UK 0.118 0.011 0.005 0.014 1.78 D 
CHN 0.167 0.031 0.049 0.028 1.87 D* 
FRA 0.124 0.013 -0.030 0.015 2.42 D* 
GER 0.146 0.013 -0.030 0.015 2.77 D* 
USA 0.133 0.009 -0.022 0.084 2.44 D* 
EM/FM 0.195 0.012 0.106 0.020 3.82 D* 
NED 0.110 0.014 0.009 0.019 1.59 N 
HUN 0.323 0.032 0.304 0.115 0.16 N 
IND 0.164 0.032 0.066 0.029 0.12 N 
TUR 0.293 0.028 0.195 0.053 1.63 N 
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from other markets in 86% of such cases. Moreover, no change in correlation occurred for Hungary, 
India and Turkey. We were only able to observe one instance of contagious effects associated with 
Russia. This was the case for Brazil, where correlations with Russian market returns increased by 
ca. 55%. As previously mentioned, Brazil and Russia were among the ten worst performing markets 
in 2014, thus the increase in correlation between returns in these two markets during the crisis period 
could be explained by the idiosyncratic downside risk factors occurring simultaneously, as well as 
by similar exposure of both countries to decline in oil prices. On the other hand, we were able to find 
evidence of decoupling of the Russian market in a series of major markets, such as China, France, 
the U.S. and Germany. Returns in these markets experienced falls in correlation with the Russian 
market of magnitudes between 71-84% (see Table 8). Similarly, emerging and frontier markets as a 
whole, represented by The MSCI Emerging and Frontier Markets (EFM) Index, experienced a fall in 
correlation by ca. 46%.  
 CHN EM/FM FRA GER USA 
 
RUS 
 
-70.66% 
 
-45.64% 
 
 
-75.48% 
 
 
-79.18% 
 
-83.53% 
 
WLD 
 
-2.55% 
 
+14.98% 
  
 
+5.69% 
 
+15.07% 
 
+0.09% 
 
Table 8 Significant decrease in correlation between the MSCI Russia the MSCI indices for China, France, Germany, the 
US, and The MSCI Emerging and Frontier Markets (EFM) Index. 
 
 
These findings strongly support the hypothesis of major decoupling of the Russian equity 
market from the markets of China, France, Germany, the U.S., as well as emerging and frontier 
markets as a whole (see Table 8). 
In our study, 90% of cases satisfy the conditions for contagion (an increase in correlation with the 
Russian market) if we do not correct for the dynamic volatility bias. On the other hand, a decrease 
in correlations occurred in ca. 85% of cases when accounting for the bias. This result emphasizes 
that results can be very misleading if the methodological issues originally raised by Forbes and 
Rigobon (2002) are not taken into account. 
We now turn our attention to deciphering the impact of the Russian equity return volatility on 
the volatility of other stock markets in our sample. In consideration of the multiplicative 
heteroskedasticity models successfully estimated in both periods, Russian equity market volatility is 
positively related to the volatility in the majority of considered markets. We find evidence that an 
important transmission of volatility associated with the Russian equity market occurred in the markets 
of Japan, Hungary, Czech Republic and Bulgaria. On the other hand, the volatility related to the 
Russian market significantly decreased in Kazakhstan. In fact, we record a large negative volatility 
co-movement between the Russian and Kazakhstani equity markets. Moreover, markets for which 
higher periods of volatility in the crisis period are associated with higher periods of volatility in the 
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Russian market during the same period are Japan, India, Hungary, China, Czech Republic, Romania 
and Bulgaria.16 
We additionally investigate whether international market returns have been subject to 
asymmetric shocks, meaning that positive and negative innovations had different magnitudes of 
effect on the mean return. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Index 
Stable period 
(2007-2014) 
Turmoil period 
(2014-2015) 
ROM P<0.0001  P<0.0001 * 
BUL P<0.0001 * P<0.0001 * 
KZK P<0.0001 * P<0.0001 * 
UKR P<0.0001  P<0.0001  
CZC P<0.0001  P<0.0001 * 
EST P<0.0001  P<0.0001  
HUN P<0.0001 * P<0.0001 * 
POL P<0.0001 * P<0.0001 * 
EM/FM P<0.0001  P<0.0001 * 
BRA P<0.0001 * P<0.0001 * 
IND P<0.0001 * P<0.0001 * 
CHN P<0.0001 * P<0.0001  
TUR P<0.0001 * P<0.0001 * 
JAP P<0.0001 * P<0.0001  
RUS P<0.0001  P<0.0001 * 
FRA P<0.0001 * P<0.0001 * 
GER P<0.0001 * P<0.0001 * 
NED P<0.0001  P<0.0001 * 
UK P<0.0001  P<0.0001 * 
US P<0.0001  P<0.0001 * 
 
Table 9 Asymmetric AR-GARCH joint significance of coefficients, where P<0.0001 indicates significance at all levels. The 
explanatory variables are world index return and Russian return; the dependent variable is the return from the markets in 
the first column. Asterisks indicate significance of the asymmetric volatility term. 
 
 
The asterisks in Table 9 indicate those countries displaying asymmetric volatility spillover 
effects. Notably, the 2014 crisis period coincided with the appearance of asymmetric effects in 
Romania, Czech Republic, Netherlands, UK, U.S. and in emerging and frontier markets as a whole. 
Overall, 55% of equity returns showed evidence of asymmetric effects. In ca. 37% of cases, 
asymmetric effects appeared after the crisis. On the other hand, the volatility of the world index return 
is shown to have a profound effect on most markets. The transmission of systematic risk from world 
markets decreased substantially in some countries (India, Japan and Czech Republic), whereas it 
noticeably increased only in Hungary.  
Finally, we briefly review the factors affecting the Russian stock market both in terms of 
returns and volatility. Appendix Figure A1 shows the six-monthly rolling daily correlations between 
the Russian market returns and returns from investing in the oil market (Brent crude) and world 
markets (MSCI World Index). It is possible to notice the stability of the correlations between the 
                                                          
16 It was not possible to specify conditional risk factors in the multiplicative heteroskedasticity equations for France, Germany, Netherlands, 
UK, US, Poland and Ukraine due to the encounter of discontinuous estimation regions. 
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Russian equity market return and returns observed in both world equity markets and oil markets. A 
falling trend towards 2012 between Russian and world equity markets, as well as a simultaneous 
protracted increase in the correlation with oil returns are particularly notable. The figure suggests 
that world markets are becoming less associable to the Russian stock market, whereas Russian 
stocks returns and oil returns are becoming more associated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 Discussion 
  Our analysis shows that the 2014 Ukrainian crisis is associated with a fall in the 
interdependence between the Russian stock market and the majority of international markets in our 
sample. Even though this crisis represents a political and economic turmoil period that did not 
originate from financial markets, the affluence of sanctions, embargos and negative sentiment from 
world markets implies the possibility of profound repercussions on international financial markets. 
We therefore tested for the presence of contagious effects and analyzed the presence and nature of 
volatility spillovers from the Russian stock market onto other markets. 
Among the main results, we find evidence of: (i) A profoundly decreased interdependence 
between the Russian equity market and 83 percent of developed, frontier and emerging markets, 
providing evidence that the Russian equity market has decoupled from global equity markets in the 
aftermath of the Ukrainian crisis; (ii) Contagious effects from Russia were found exclusively for the 
Brazilian market. The inferior performance of Brazilian and Russian markets in 2014 suggests that 
the increase in correlation between returns in these markets in the crisis period could be associated 
with the simultaneous effect of idiosyncratic downside risk factors as well as by a similar exposure 
of both countries to a declining oil price. No change in cross-market co-movements was found in the 
emerging markets of Hungary, India and Turkey; (iii) we show that Russian equity market volatility 
is positively related to equity volatility in the majority of international markets. Moreover, our results 
indicate that the Ukrainian crisis was characterized by large transmissions of volatility from Russia 
towards the markets of Japan, Hungary, Czech Republic and Bulgaria. On the other hand, volatility 
in Kazakhstan associated with the Russian market, where the co-movement with Russian equity 
returns was found to be negative, fell considerably. We find evidence of volatility interdependence 
between Russia and Japan, India, Hungary, China, Czech Republic, Romania and Bulgaria. Finally, 
we show that (iv) the Ukrainian crisis period coincided with the appearance of asymmetric effects in 
Romania, Czech Republic, Netherlands, the UK, the US and emerging and frontier markets as a 
whole. 
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 The main contributions of this paper are twofold. On one hand, we show that the Russian 
market became increasingly isolated from the majority of other stock markets. Such markets were 
not subject to contagious effects, rather showing signs of lower associations with the Russian 
market. This also applies to emerging and frontier markets and is in line with Serwa and Bohl (2005), 
who find that the Central and Eastern European stock markets do not appear to be more vulnerable 
to contagion than Western European markets. In addition, European markets, as well as emerging 
and frontier markets, did not appear to be affected by abnormal volatility during the Ukrainian crisis. 
However, we report large transmissions of volatility associated with the Russian market in the 
majority of global financial markets, especially emerging and frontier markets. Aside from such 
volatility interdependence, in terms of financial contagion, the results of this paper offer support to 
international investors including ex-Soviet, emerging and frontier market stocks in their portfolios, 
showing that, at least after one year, the Ukrainian crisis has not induced particular costs on these 
markets. Moreover, we show that the crisis concurred with the presence of asymmetric spillover 
effects as positive returns had a smaller impact on future volatility than negative returns of the same 
absolute magnitude, in the majority of world equity markets considered. This may be associated to 
the leverage effect (Andersen et al., 2001), whereby large negative returns increase financial and 
operating leverage in turn contributing towards the increase in equity return volatility (e.g. Christie, 
1982; Black, 1976), This may raise liquidity concerns or may alternatively be the result of a volatility 
feedback effect (e.g. Campbell and Hentschel, 1992), which may have positive implications for equity 
options investors in emerging and frontier markets. 
Most of the empirical evidence present in the literature on financial contagion either confirms 
the hypothesis of contagion (e.g. Chiang et al., 2007; Kenourgios, 2011; Dungey and Gajurel, 2014) 
or dismisses it (e.g. Forbes and Rigobon, 2002; Collins and Biekpe, 2002). Only in a few cases (e.g. 
Dooley and Hutchison, 2009; Dimitriou et al., 2013) did research studies find signs of decoupling 
during major crises, as in this study. 
The main drawback of our analysis is the use of a single year of daily data (March 2014-April 
2015) to represent the crisis period. However, our investigation is consistent and robust to a wide 
variety of model and data specifications, as discussed earlier. In addition, the possibility of selection 
bias was circumvented with the use of a comprehensive set of world markets and the dynamic 
volatility bias was avoided by using a heteroskedastic approach. 
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8 Conclusions 
The Russian economy was severely hurt by the impact of international sanctions and the 
decrease in oil prices. In this environment, the outlook for Russian equities remained at best 
unpredictable and at worst dire. 
According to our results, the Russian market significantly decoupled from the majority of stock 
markets and should arguably become a special case in the minds of most investors. As far as the 
developments in capital markets are concerned, it appears that, as intended, the political and 
economic sanctions imposed on Russia were successful in generating idiosyncratic shock for the 
country with limited repercussions for the rest of the world. 
Our results provide evidence that a decrease of international markets’ returns correlation with 
Russian stock returns occurred rather uniformly across developed, emerging, and frontier markets, 
regardless of the strength of economic ties with Russia. Russian markets have not been so weakly 
correlated with global markets since the early 2000s, when Russia was barely part of international 
equity portfolios. With Russian financial markets increasingly driven by domestic news rather than 
global sentiment, the links of the Russian stock market with the rest of the world, and its immediate 
neighbors in particular, are likely to depend on the dynamics of the ruble, oil prices, capital outflows, 
indicators of the level of stress in the financial system and political news. 
In view of the dramatic decline in market capitalization, its uncertain outlook, and the verified 
decoupling from world markets, Russia may now be on the path toward being downgraded from its 
emerging market status and its role in the BRICS is likely to gradually reduce. 
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Appendix 
 
 
 
 Index 
GARCH Asymmetric GARCH DCC GARCH VCC GARCH 
AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC 
ROM -8638.175 -8589.608 -8320.161 -8266.197 -8640.707 -8597.626 -8266.111 -8244.526 
BUL -8853.338 -8804.771 -8467.260* -8413.297* -8846.056 -8802.886 -8410.498 -8388.912 
KZK -8783.087 -8734.520 -8468.444* -8414.481* -8779.376 -8736.206 -8168.061 -8146.475 
UKR -8325.331 -8276.764 -8036.375 -7982.412 -8325.402 -8282.231 -7620.770 -7599.184 
CZC -9475.812 -9427.245 -9219.528 -9165.565 -9477.207 -9434.036 -9022.502 -9000.917 
EST -8815.807 -8767.239 -8665.558 -8611.595 -8813.168 -8769.997 -8480.075 -8458.489 
HUN -8573.660 -8525.093 -8280.967* -8227.004* -8575.095 -8531.924 -8134.744 -8113.159 
POL -9316.363 -9267.796 -9050.415* -8996.452* -9313.394 -9270.223 -8885.221 -8863.636 
EM/FM -11815.570 -11767.000 -11466.600 -11412.640 -11791.620 -11748.450 -11342.010 -11320.430 
BRA -9762.212 -9713.645 -9465.957* -9417.390* -9745.830 -9702.659 -9592.798 -9565.816 
IND -8994.101 -8945.534 -8700.662* -8646.699* -8971.460 -8928.289 -8607.132 -8585.547 
CHN -9242.935 -9194.368 -8864.459* -8810.496* -9199.762 -9156.591 -8699.909 -8678.323 
TUR -8709.337 -8660.770 -8512.525* -8458.561* -8709.764 -8666.593 -8467.334 -8445.749 
JAP -9589.629 -9541.062 -9347.077* -9233.114* -9523.13 -9479.96 -9106.269 -9084.684 
RUS -9294.421 -9197.287 -8639.094 -8574.338 -9254.713 -9200.750 -8414.902 -8371.731 
FRA -10827.42 -10778.85 -10387.37* -10333.40* -10791.270 -10748.100 -10273.38 -10251.79 
GER -10922.85 -10874.28 -10595.90* -10552.73* -10896.82 -10853.65 -10418.24 -10396.65 
NED -10952.53 -10903.97 -10626.69 -10572.72 -10846.97 -10803.80 -10846.97 -10803.80 
UK -11475.90 -11427.34 -11085.86 -11031.90 -11409.21 -11366.04 -10742.04 -10720.46 
US -12469.60 -12421.03 -11937.06 -11893.89 -12381.85 -12338.68 -12381.85 -12338.68 
 
Table A1 AR(1)-GARCH(1,1), Asymmetric GARCH(1,1), DCC and VCC AR(1)-GARCH(1,1) models AIC and BIC. 
Asterisks indicate statistical significance (alpha=0.05) of asymmetry coefficient for the 19 international markets, during the 
pre-Crisis period (November 2007-February 2014). 
 
 
 
 
GARCH  Asymmetric GARCH DCC-GARCH VCC-GARCH 
AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC 
ROM -1875.184 -1849.447 -1874.893* -1838.125 -1878.329 -1848.915 -1876.088 -1861.381 
BUL -1678.852 -1645.761 -1665.481* -1628.714* -1671.743 -1642.329 -1661.106 -1646.399 
KZK -1523.934 -1490.843 -1468.552* -1431.784 -1525.146 -1495.732 -1427.172 -1412.465 
UKR -1114.366 -1088.629 -1148.078 -1118.664 -1116.261 -1094.200 -1045.933 -1031.226 
CZC -1850.884 -1817.793 -1846.472* -1809.704* -1852.867 -1823.453 -1845.520 -1830.813 
EST -1838.403 -1805.313 -1844.372 -1807.604 -1840.266 -1810.852 -1839.259 -1824.552 
HUN -1664.444 -1631.353 -1663.621* -1626.854* -1663.777 -1634.363 -1657.149 -1642.442 
POL -1461.061 -1431.647 -1913.852* -1877.084* -1901.856 -1879.795 -1902.588 -1887.881 
EM/FM -2263.18 -2237.442 -2261.742* -2232.328* -2269.596 -2240.282 -2266.327 -2251.620 
BRA -1536.414 -1503.323 -1497.684* -1346.593* -1538.376 -1508.962 -1522.745 -1504.361 
IND -1941.854 -1908.763 -1919.037* -1893.300* -1940.549 -1911.135 -1920.462 -1905.755 
CHN -1857.118 -1824.027 -1849.167 -1812.400 -1856.853 -1827.439 -1844.374 -1829.667 
TUR -1588.218 -1555.127 -1593.604* -1556.837* -1590.218 -1560.804 -1594.696 -1579.989 
JAP -1934.863 -1901.773 -1908.909 -1872.141 -1920.471 -1891.057 -1878.100 -1863.393 
RUS -1469.379 -1428.934 -1446.409* -1402.288* -1468.791 -1432.024 -1403.463 -1374.048 
FRA -2167.79 -2134.699 -2145.074* -2108.307* -2159.495 -2130.081 -2132.532 -2117.825 
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GER -2071.705 -2045.967 -2058.336* -2021.568* -2097.932 -2068.518 -2049.211 -2034.504 
NED -2161.622 -2135.885 -2140.341* -2110.927* -2160.622 -2138.562 -2160.622 -2138.562 
UK -2230.527 -2204.789 -2221.573* -2192.159* -2229.372 -22207.311 -2196.775 -2182.068 
US -2556.874 -2531.137 -2542.692* -2530.632° -2542.518 -2521.457 -2543.518 -2521.457 
 
Table A2 AR(1)-GARCH(1,1), SAARCH(1,1), DCC and VCC AR(1)-GARCH(1,1) models AIC and BIC. Asterisks indicate 
statistical significance (alpha=0.05) of asymmetry coefficient for the 19 international markets, during the Crisis period 
(March 2014-April 2015). 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. A1 – Daily stock index returns of the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China) over the full studied period, 
November 30, 2007 to April 15, 2014. The start of the Ukrainian crisis (March 1, 2014) is indicated with a vertical line. 
 
 
Fig. A2 – Daily stock index returns of the three emerging markets (Hungary, Poland, Turkey) and the MSCI emerging and 
frontier market index return over the full studied period, November 30, 2007 to April 15, 2014. The start of the Ukrainian 
crisis (March 1, 2014) is indicated with a vertical line. 
 
 30 
 
 
Fig. A3 – Daily stock index returns of the six developed markets (France, Germany, Netherlands, UK, US, Japan) over the 
full studied period, November 30, 2007 to April 15, 2014. The start of the Ukrainian crisis (March 1, 2014) is indicated with 
a vertical line. 
 
 
Fig. A4 – Daily stock index returns of the four frontier markets (Romania, Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, Ukraine) and two emerging 
markets (Czech Republic and Estonia) over the full studied period, November 30, 2007 to April 15, 2014. The start of the 
Ukrainian crisis (March 1, 2014) is indicated with a vertical line. 
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Fig. A5 – Rolling correlations of the Russian stock return and returns in Brazil, India, China, Japan, during the period May 
2008-April 2014. The rolling window encloses a 6-month trading period starting in November 2007. The dotted line indicates 
the start of the 2014 Ukrainian crisis. 
 
 
Fig. A6 – Rolling correlation of the Russian stock return and returns in emerging and frontier markets (EM/FM index return), 
Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Turkey, in the period May 2008-April 2014. The rolling window encloses a 6-month trading 
period starting in November 2007. The dotted line indicates the start of the 2014 Ukrainian crisis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. A7 – Rolling correlation of the Russian stock return and returns in: France, Germany, Netherlands, UK and US, during 
the period May 2008-April 2014. The rolling window encloses a 6-month trading period starting in November 2007. The 
dotted line indicates the start of the 2014 Ukrainian crisis.  
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Fig. A8 – Rolling correlations of the Russian stock return and returns in: Romania, Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and 
Czech Republic, in the period May 2008-April 2014. The rolling window encloses a 6-month trading period starting in 
November 2007. The dotted line indicates the start of the 2014 Ukrainian crisis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. A9 – Rolling average correlations of daily returns on the MSCI Russia with the Brent crude price returns and the MSCI 
World Index return, in the period May 2008-April 2014. The rolling 6-month window starts in November 2007. The dotted 
line indicates the start of the 2014 Ukrainian crisis.  
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Fig. A10 – AR(1)-MGARCH(1,1) prediction of the variance of Russian stock index return in the period November 2007-
April 2015, fitted with a fourth-order dynamic polynomial formulation. The dotted line indicates the start of the 2014 
Ukrainian crisis. Dynamic 95% confidence bounds are depicted integration. 
